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Abstract The participation of non-state actors in implementation processes is often
understood as a means to increase compliance efficiency. But the implementation of spatial
policies frequently focuses on pre-established goals, processes and instruments and thus
renders difficult open discourse and shared decision-making. This paper introduces conflict
pattern analysis (CPA) as a tool that supports the analysis of the actual actor constellation
in order to define efficient approaches that avoid common problems of participatory pro-
cesses. CPA is a semi-formalised method that helps to identify key-actors, their relations
and interaction amongst each other as well as their core beliefs, interests and resources. It
aggregates this information to interaction patterns that can be compared, classified and
linked to different participatory methods on a theoretically informed basis. Particularly on
the local and regional level, this could be the first step for successful (participatory)
implementation strategies.
Keywords Conflict analysis  Actor networks  Nature conservation 
Implementation  Participation
Introduction
The transformation of European directives with environmental and spatial foci into visible
action on local and regional level is even more fragmentary and belated than legal com-
pliance in the European Union member states (CEC 2006). Implementation of land
management policies, in particular, takes place in a highly politicised setting that is often
characterised by conflicts between various actors competing for restricted resources such as
space, money or influence (Niemela¨ et al. 2005; Stoll-Kleemann 2001; Valve 2002).
Experience from spatial planning research suggests the potential of participatory tech-
niques to deal with or prevent from such conflicts in order to reach and implement societal
binding decisions that generate visible impact on land management. Correspondingly,
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participation is requested by affected actors and civil society organisations for reasons of
democracy and has become an administrative standard to assure legitimacy.
However, implementation takes place in a complex multilevel legal and administrative
setting which channels the roles and options of the involved actors. The vertical interaction
between different administrative levels and the horizontal interaction between different
policy fields and organisations are strongly influenced by this institutional frame. European
Directives leave little leeway for deliberation as they follow pre-established goals, pro-
cesses and instruments. Hence, a kind of ‘‘administered participation’’ that utilises the
niches left by the political programme is required in this context (Dahl 1994; Healey 1999)
and makes high demands on the selection of appropriate participatory methods:
To start with, the current situation has to be analysed in order to frame the scope and
conditions of the planned participatory process. Only on this basis it is possible to choose
the appropriate method(s). This in turn requires a sound knowledge on the performance and
prerequisites of available participatory techniques.
There is a growing body of literature, dealing with the purposes, prerequisites, scopes and
potential impacts of available participation techniques in resource management. The contri-
butions either reflect on meaningful evaluation criteria on a rather normative basis (Rowe and
Frewer 2000) or strive for a systematic evaluation and comparison of empirical cases (Newig
et al. 2006; van Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp 2002; Kallis et al. 2006; Stirling 2006; Rauschmayer
and Wittmer 2006; Rowe and Frewer 2000 in research: Welp et al. 2006; Zierhofer and Burger
2007). Both strands of literature highlight the peculiarity of every specific case, but agree on
three common categories of factors that influence the performance of participatory techniques.
To sum up, these are the resources involved, the constellation of actors and the kind of outputs
and/or outcomes at the end of the participatory process. These aspects are either described as
variables that classify different techniques (e.g. techniques that are appropriate to involve several
actors or techniques that strive for a final policy relevant document etc.) or as variables that could
inform the choice of techniques (e.g. availability of resources, given conflict types within an
actor constellation etc.). However, they give no indication on the assessment of the current
situation that could support the definition of scope and prerequisites of a participatory process.
The methods for such assessments are still underdeveloped even though first attempts
have been made. Development cooperation, for example, brought about approaches to
obtain an understanding of the situation at hand which are still barely absorbed in Europe
(Hjortsø et al. 2005).
Social network analysis has been applied to participation processes recently (Hubacek
et al. 2006) but as it focuses on the quantity and frequency of relations it still falls short in
analysing the available resources or the desirable outputs of a process; the quality and
relevance of the relations and interactions between actors remain unclear (Hollstein 2006).
Hence, no statement about the scope and conditions of a desirable participatory process can
be made merely on the basis of a classic social network analysis. More pragmatic
approaches of stakeholder analysis aim at a comprehensive understanding of actors
(Breitschuh and Feige 2003), without connecting this knowledge explicitly to feasible
participatory techniques.
To fill this gap, I propose Conflict Pattern Analysis (CPA) as a pragmatic analytical tool
for the analysis of actor constellations prior to the participatory process. CPA has the
potential to inform the choice of adequate (participatory) instruments by addressing:
– Actors including their rationales and action scopes and their resources.
– Conflict interactions in the affected policy field.
– Links to suitable steering and participation approaches.
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The paper is organised in the following way: to start with, I will shortly describe the
empirical background that led to the development of CPA, followed by presenting the
conceptual framework underlying this approach. In the main part, I describe CPA focusing
on the operationalisation of central variables, the gathering of necessary data and their
interpretation. This section is followed by conceptual considerations on how to link the
results of CPA to established participation techniques. In the conclusion I will discuss the
applicability of CPA in other contexts than policy implementation, highlighting the
advantages and shortcomings compared to other, less formalised methods.
Empirical Background: The Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) in Germany
The European Habitats Directive aims at establishing Natura 2000, a coherent network for
the protection of habitats and species in the European Union. Its implementation faced
difficulties in most member states and the intended time schedule was broken (CEC 2006).
In Germany the selection of suitable sites that meet the directive’s criteria was only
completed in 2005, although scheduled for 1995. Next to legal inconsistencies, conflicts on
local and regional level hampered implementation. The resistance of land users, land
owners and their associations against the protection of private land amounted to demon-
strations, lawsuits and political pressure and delayed the process. Furthermore, rivalry
between administrative levels and departments and competition for tasks and budgets led
to an inconsistent handling of Natura 2000. To analyse the reasons for these problems and
to derivate management strategies for the protection of the sites, the German Federal
Agency of Nature Conservation commissioned a scientific study on ‘‘enhancing the
acceptance of Natura 2000-sites’’. This study was carried out under collaboration of the
author at the chair of forest policy at the Technical University of Munich (Sauer et al.
2006). The initial data was gathered in ten qualitative case studies and consisted mainly of
64 problem oriented interviews with 74 people belonging to one of the following groups:
nature conservation authorities, land-users and land-owners, conservationist associations,
land-use associations, technical authorities (forestry, farming, fishery) and politicians. In
this study, CPA was developed first for analytical purposes, then modified for practical use
and applied in a praxis-oriented project of the German Landcare Association, a joint
voluntary association of farmers, local communities and conservationists. The results of
these studies will be used to illustrate CAP in section ‘‘Conflict Pattern Analysis’’ and to
discuss the transferability of CPA to other subjects than implementation conflicts section
(‘‘Conclusion’’).
Conceptual Framework
In this paper, the development and implementation of natural resource management
regimes is understood as a political process that aims at reaching societaly binding deci-
sions on the use of restricted resources. The conceptual framework underlying CPA builds
on this understanding of natural resource management as a political process and sees actors
and their interaction as central elements in it.
In particular, collective actors like public administration or associations play an
important role in natural resource management. Concepts of collective actors often expect
them to act rationally and predictably in accordance with their stable organisational goals
and norms. The division of work and their capacity to build up and manage huge
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knowledge stocks should provide them the necessary resources to strive effectively for
their benefit (Geser 1990). However, due to the complexity and dynamics of the physical
and social factors concerned in natural resource management, no complete knowledge on
the system can be obtained. The prerequisites and impacts of organisational decisions and
actions remain uncertain. This is why (collective) actors in this paper are conceptualised as
seekers for their subjective expected utility: they strive for rational reasoning, but rely also
on features like ideologies, stereotypes and habits that help to reduce complexity (Esser
1990; Geser 1990; Kronenberg 2005).
To conceptualise the interaction between actors in the realm of natural resource man-
agement as well as the impacts of these interactions on the physical world, I rely on policy
analysis approaches. Policy analysis focuses on political processes with emphasis on the
conditions and impacts of policy change. In this field, the Institutional Analysis Devel-
opment Framework (IADF) of Elinor Ostrom and Edella Schlager, the Actor Centred
Institutionalism (ACI) of Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf and the Advocacy Coalitions
Framework (ACF) of Paul Sabatier are elaborated concepts that guide research on actors,
institutions and policy change (Ostrom 1999; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1999). They build on rational choice theory, but are open enough to allow
for an intefgration of contributions of other disciplines like group psychology, organisa-
tional sociology or sociological action theories (Schlager 1999). Hence, they are suitable to
catch the chosen concept of actors that strive for their subjective expected utility.
Even if they place different emphasis on the meaning of rules (Ostrom 2005), orien-
tation and coordination (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) or beliefs and preferences (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith 1999), all three approaches have a similar understanding of the central
elements of a political process. These are the actor arena, attributes of actors, the inter-
action of actors and the action context. To set up the conceptual framework of CPA that
guides the analysis of natural resource management regimes, these elements have been
adopted, specified and complemented (Fig. 1).
In the centre of the framework is the actor arena consisting of a certain amount of
actors (1 – n) and their interactions. An actor is understood as an acting entity comprising
one ore more persons (collective actors, organisations). Every actor has different resources
he/she can use for action (e.g. material resources, knowledge, capabilities). As actions are
deliberate attitudes of actors, the orientation of an actor directs her/his actions. The ori-
entation in turn is composed of internal norms (values, culture, ideologies, stereotypes,
habits…) and external norms (rules, expectations). Collective actors are composed of
individuals that are characterised by their individual resources and orientation (cf. actor 2
in the figure). Following the considerations of Mayntz and Scharpf (1995), these indi-
viduals should only be considered individually if any action can solely be contributed to
the individual and not the organisation as a whole (cf. also Geser 1990). The interaction of
actors can be one-way or reciprocal and it is either persuasive or consenting. Inserted into a
fourfold table, one can distinguish coordination, (consenting-reciprocal), consultation
(consenting-one-way), information (persuasive-one-way) and conflict (persuasive-
reciprocal).
The interaction in the actor arena leads to or changes individual or collective action that
has an effect on the physical world. However, in complex natural resource management
regimes, such effects can only be ascribed partially to simple cause–and–effect relations.
This is even more valid, as the action context has an impact on all features of the presented
framework. It comprises stable and dynamic aspects of the physical world (e.g. habitats
and species, weather, built environment…) and the social world (e.g. elections, existing
institutions and institutional changes…).
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Interventions into the political process in order to influence the development and
implementation of natural resource management regimes can be operated from the outside
by changing the action context or from the inside by changing one’s behaviour and, hence,
the interaction within the arena. Accordingly, participatory methods can be introduced
from the outside (e.g. through administrative standards, legal innovations) or encouraged
from inside the arena (e.g. self-organisation).
Conflict Pattern Analysis
In the following section I give a methodological introduction to CPA, starting with the
operationalisation of the central variables deduced from the theoretical framework
(Operationalisation of Central Variables), then describing how the primary data is
aggregated to illustrative conflict patterns (Construction of Conflict Patterns) and outlining
survey methods (Data Gathering). The interpretation of specific conflict patterns and their
potential for a cross-case assessment are discussed afterwards (Analysis of Conflict
Patterns).
Operationalisation of Central Variables
Actor Type
A common distinction of actors in stakeholder analysis and policy evaluation is made
alongside their roles in the (policy) process, distinguishing between those potentially
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework
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affected by a project or programme (primary stakeholders), those responsible for its design
and execution (secondary stakeholders) and those acting as facilitators, hinderers or
co-actors (external stakeholders). The latter exploit the process to pursue self-interests that
are not necessarily connected to the policy field or issue under consideration (Busmann
et al. 1997; Hjortsø et al. 2005; ODA 1995; Prittzwitz 1990). This concept of three actor
types is challenged by the hybrid role of clientele oriented administration: whilst actors
from civil society like non-governmental organisations and pressure groups are unques-
tionably external actors who strive to realise their own interests per definition,
administrative actors can be seen as hybrids between external and primary stakeholders.
Technical authorities like forestry administration, for example, are responsible for
encouraging common welfare and the observance of European law but guard the interests
of their clientele and their department at the same time (Krott 2001; Thomas 2003). To sum
up, responsible actors, affected actors, external actors and hybrid actors are distinguished
in CPA. This distinction allows for a first assessment of their general orientation and
function that provides them role-dependent resources. Responsible actors, for example, are
likely to take leadership in the formulation of procedures and standards, striving to be
informed on the issue under consideration and are (at least partly) equipped with norm-
setting power.
To this functional classification an issue dimension must be added, which indicates the
policy field an actor institutionally belongs to (e.g. forestry, nature conservation, energy).
The specific characteristics of a policy field are part of the action context that shapes the
orientation and interaction of actors in natural resource management conflicts. They are
especially relevant as natural resource management usually affects different policy fields at
the same time.
These two aspects of horizontal actor differentiation are complemented by a vertical
component that incorporates the multilevel aspects of land management issues mentioned
in the introduction. Every organisational level has different structures and shapes the action
scope of the corresponding actors differently.
To sum up, the actor classification in CPA comprises functional, subject and multi-level
aspects and allows the classification of every actor according to its role, its position and its
main interest sphere.
Resources
The resources of an actor can be distinguished into those she potentially possesses and
those she is willing to capitalise in a specific situation. For conflict analysis, the power
potential of an actor, her potential to exert influence in an interaction situation is essential.
This potential is highly dependent on the actor type as power resources are only effective if
they are legitimised and accepted by other actors (Stark 2000). This recognition of
resources is strongly connected to the role of an actor: a scientist, for example, will rather
be respected as knowledge provider on ecological systems or the needs of a specific species
than a farmer, no matter how profound the farmer’s knowledge might be (Soini and
Aakkula 2007). Hence, the power potential is a product of available resources and their
successful usage.
Depending on the role and the main resources an actor possesses (e.g. working force,
money, knowledge, capabilities, social capital and/or institutional support) four types of
power potential are distinguished: (1) Definition power to shape a technical discourse. It
depends on knowledge and on the credibility of this knowledge as explained above. (2)
Informal power to organise approval or rejection among other actors. It depends on the
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networking capabilities as well as the number and type of supportive actors or members
(typical for associations). (3) Material power to directly influence actors and processes. It
depends on material resources like budget, money, real estate and employees. (4) Nor-
mative power to define rules and norms that are respected by others. It depends on the legal
and administrative legitimisation of an actor.
The power potential of an actor can be estimated by assessing her formal and informal
(executed) role and her available resources (e.g. members of an association, political
contacts, institutional framework, budget).
Orientation
Understanding the orientation of actors in terms of their worldview, ideologies and their
perception of a specific situation is necessary to estimate their commitment in natural
resource management. Eliciting these orientations is an integral part of (participatory)
processes and cannot be covered comprehensively prior to the management process.
Nevertheless, it is important to assess the main orientations concerning the issue under
consideration and concerning other actors to get a sound picture of the situation. Hanke
et al. (2002) for example, highlight the importance of different framings of different
stakeholder groups for the evolution (and with it also for the understanding) of environ-
mental conflicts.
In CPA, the orientation towards issues and actors is differentiated by an activity
dimension and an judgemental dimension following Beck’s analysis of group processes
(Beck 2001). Orientations are either activating, that is favouring action, or stabilizing and
hence favouring passivity. Furthermore it can be rather positive or negative. Combining
these dimensions, CPA distinguishes four orientations: approach (positive-activating),
agreement (positive-stabilizing), rejection (negative-activating) and avoidance (negative-
stabilizing) (Fig. 2). They help to estimate the probability that one actor invests her proper
resources in order to support or hamper a resource management process. Orientations can
be estimated by analysing figurative expressions an actor uses. To give an example: talking
about Natura 2000 as a ‘‘shroud for farmers’’ indicates disapproval and resignation and
suggests only moderate activity against Natura 2000 which is taken for a (negative) fact
(avoidance).
activating stabilizing 
positive 
negative 
approach agreement 
rejection avoidance 
Fig. 2 Dimensions of actors’
orientations
Syst Pract Action Res (2008) 21:497–515 503
123
Whilst orientations are strongly influenced by internal norms, interests are more
strongly shaped by external norms. They are linked to the resources an actor is striving for.
Accordingly, in CPA, they are distinguished into four spheres: (1) to gain influence is the
typical orientation of politicians, civil society actors and partly technical authorities
(Thomas 2003) and entrepreneurs, (2) maintaining and gaining (financial) autonomy is the
typical interest of affected actors that try to avoid constraints from new policies, (3) a broad
societal legitimacy is one of the main interests of political actors and administration. (4)
The development of normative standards like the ‘‘definition’’ of common welfare or ‘‘best
practises’’ in natural resource management is typical for public administration.
Despite the close link between roles, resources and interests, actors often show a
complex pattern of orientations and interests that can mutate depending on the specific
action context. However, rejection and contradictory interests within an actor arena favour
the emergence of conflicts.
Conflict Types
With reference to the conceptual framework, conflicts are understood as persuasive and
reciprocal interaction between actors. They emerge if actors within an actor arena compete
for resources, or if they have to fight for the recognition of their resources. Hence, conflicts
are directly linked to the interests of actors. Dependent on the interests at stake, conflicts
are relational, concerning the hierarchy and position within the actor arena (conflict of
position), idealistic, concerning contradicting orientations (value conflict), material, con-
cerning the distribution of material resources (distributional conflicts) or regulatory,
concerning the validity and compliance of norms (rule conflict) (Giesen 1993). The higher
the rationality of a conflict the less probable is an escalation that would lead to abandon
formal or informal rules of a fair and societal accepted interaction. The closer the conflict
issue is related to the internal orientation of an actor, in turn, the more emotional becomes
the interaction. Conflicts of position directly affect the (social) position of an actor and
have a high potential to be dealt with emotionally, value conflicts concern internalised
orientations and with it partly the identity of actors, whereas distributional conflicts con-
cern mainly the material belongings of actors. Rule conflicts are the most rational ones, as
they are rather detached from individual convictions and rotate around the general meaning
of norms and laws.
However, conflicts cannot be reduced to simple relations between two actors who
compete for one particular resource (reciprocal conflict). They are often imbalanced in the
sense that the interests at stake differ from actor to actor and lead to an ‘‘integrated or
mixed conflict’’. A farmer, for example, might be highly emotionally engaged in arguing
on the ‘‘right’’ farming practise (value conflict), whilst his opponent is only interested in
forcing him to obey a decree on mowing dates for meadows (rule conflict). Latent or
suppressed conflicts, in turn, can be unidirectional if they are only perceived by one actor
whilst his ‘‘opponent’’ does not feel involved. This happens mainly in the interaction
between individual and collective actors (e.g. client-administration). In CPA, accordingly,
the direction of a conflict plays an important role: conflict types can only be specified by
taking the perspective of specific actors. The orientation of one actor regarding other actors
or issues indicates the potential of her, being involved in a conflict (rejection and avoid-
ance). The interests at stake, determine the conflict type: striving for influence tends to
result in conflicts of position, striving for being a standard setter induces value conflicts,
striving for autonomy induces distributional conflicts and striving for legitimacy tends to
result in rule conflicts. The resources of the actors in the action arena, in turn, determine the
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potential for an escalation of conflicts as well as their potential to enforce their claims and
to ‘‘win’’ a conflict.
As it was stated above, actors are often pursuing a complex pattern of interests, whereas
the interest in developing normative standards is slightly linked with legitimacy and
striving for influence is often connected to autonomy issues. Hence, rule conflicts tend to
escalate to value conflicts, while distributional conflicts easily develop a positional com-
ponent as well. Table 1 summarises the relations between conflict types, interest spheres
and the usefulness of resources.
Construction of Conflict Patterns
With the specification of actor types, orientations and resources and their aggregation to
conflict types, it is possible to draw a ‘‘picture’’ of the situation in the actor arena. For this
purpose, every actor is assigned to her position in a two dimensional grid that reflects the
institutional level and the policy field (issue dimension) an actor belongs to. Distinguishing
further between primary, secondary, external and hybrid actors, every actor is classified
with regard to the three main dimensions described in ‘‘Actor type’’. Then, the interactions
between those actors are added, distinguishing between conflict types and the direction of
these conflicts (reciprocal, one-way, mixed).
Such a diagram reveals a concise picture of the situation as it shows at a glance the
prevalent conflict types (and with it the degree of rationalisation) and central and unaf-
fected actors. As these insights are connected with the background information on policy
fields, orientation and resources, it is possible to estimate the potential of escalation or
settlement of the detected conflicts. Preliminary hypothesis on conflict drivers and the
action scopes of the involved actors can be formulated. Figure 3 shows one example that is
drawn from the underlying case study (case no. 9); the analysis of conflict patterns is
further described in section ‘‘Analysis of Conflict Patterns’’.
Data Gathering
The gathering of necessary data depends on the purpose of CPA in the respective case.
Applying it for scientific analysis, the whole array of (structured) methods of qualitative
social research, ranging from document analysis, problem-oriented interviews to obser-
vation could and should be applied. Using CPA as a pragmatic analytical tool for designing
Table 1 Characteristics of different conflict types in terms of degree of rationalisation, prevalent interest
sphere affected and the potential of different power resources for gaining influence in the conflict
Conflict type Interest sphere Potential of resource typea
Material Definition Informal Norm setting
Rationalisation
Conflict of position Influence (autonomy) ? ? ?? ?
Value conflict Standard setting (legitimacy) o ?? ?? ?
Distributional conflict Autonomy (influence) ?? ? ? ?
Rule conflict Legitimacy (standard setting) o o ? ??
a ?? great potential, ? high potential, o medium potential to gain influence
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participatory processes, the data gathering has to be as simple as possible, mainly relying
on general and accessible documents, protocols and every-day knowledge of administra-
tive staff or other actors who are familiar with the case.
For the implementation of the Habitats Directive, a standardised checklist has been
developed that starts with a general description of the case (main land-use activities, threats
to habitats and species, experience with protection schemes). It also includes an overview
over known actors and their orientation towards the issue under consideration (e.g. local
Natura 2000 protection schemes). These insights were supplemented by an estimation of
historic or latent conflicts and development in other policy fields that could effect the
actual situation (e.g. unemployment, bad/good experience with nature conservation, the
European Union, existing strategies in town and country planning…). These data could
mainly be taken from standard data forms and local authorities that compiled the list. Such
a checklist has to be tailor made for the specific question under consideration; hence, the
instrument is more valuable, the more cases exist. If the available knowledge is not
sufficient to get a clear understanding of the conflicts in the actor arena, short problem
oriented interviews with key-actors proved to be helpful. Interviews have the advantage of
forcing actors to explain their statements (often using figurative expressions that reveal
their orientations) but are time and cost consuming and ask for a neutral third party
conducting the interviews.
However, the conceptual structure of CPA allows for an integration of different types
of empirical data that are complemented with theory driven considerations. Gaps can be
filled (at least partially) by general considerations on the links between actor types,
resources and conflicts within an actor arena. This reduces the need for empirical work to
a minimum.
Fig. 3 Graphical representation of conflict patterns
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Analysis of Conflict Patterns
A single conflict pattern shows the relations of actors in an actor arena and identifies
affected and less affected actors; it indicates the core interests that are involved in the
conflicts and reveals information about actor types, resources, orientation, affiliation and
roles of actors. Thus, the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the actor arena, the vertical,
horizontal or ‘‘diagonal’’ orientation of conflicts across institutional levels and policy fields
and their degree of rationalisation become apparent. This reduces the risk of ignoring or
misinterpreting conflicts and helps to discover their hidden drivers. Intra- and interagency
conflicts, for example, are often underestimated in resource management. The (public)
perception is mainly restricted to bipolar conflicts between ‘‘land-use’’ and ‘‘nature con-
servation’’ as they find their articulation via media, law suits etc. Conflicts, in this context,
are often seen as distributional conflicts regarding the generation of proceeds through land
use. This stereotyping of land management conflicts often covers underlying positional or
value conflicts.
Ten cases that were analysed in the underlying case study (cf. section ‘‘Conceptual
Framework’’) are shown in the annex. Case 2, for example, reveals the difficult relation
between nature conservation and forestry administration. If situated at the same level,
their conflicts are mainly rational (rule or distributional conflicts). Once there are more
institutional levels involved, the relations become emotional as the agencies compete for
influence and the conflicts get relational. The entire case is dominated by conflicts
between forestry and nature conservation administration, with only one affected great
landowner who is directly engaging on state level. He is involved in a ‘‘typical’’ dis-
tributional conflict as his main power resource is of material nature (real estate, jobs). In
addition, he obviously possesses informal power through his lobbying and networking
activities that allow him to intervene directly on federal state level. One community is
playing an inferior part as it is not directly affected by conflicts but has a general interest
in the issue due to its community development projects that might be affected by Natura
2000. Despite this low involvement in conflicts, an engagement as supportive third-party
institution seems questionable as the community neither possesses normative, nor defi-
nition, nor material power in the corresponding policy field that would allow for an
effective intervention.
Different is the situation in cases 6, 8 and 10 with prevalent conflicts between the
various levels of nature conservation administration that hamper the efficient implemen-
tation of Natura 2000. They originate mainly in the struggle for competences (=influence,
autonomy) and differing normative standards between the administrative levels. Neither
the ‘‘right’’ conservation approach nor the responsibilities for it are agreed upon. Appar-
ently, such conflicts require rather internal organisation development strategies, than broad
citizen participation, as it might be appropriate for the ‘‘typical’’ nature conservation
conflict in case 2.
As for the purpose of this paper, it would lead too far to describe the outcomes of all ten
cases, but the potential of CPA for cross-case assessment becomes apparent. Unfolding
prevalent constellations supports the search for adapted strategies on super ordinate levels
instead of designing isolated solutions for single projects or cases. Policy making in natural
resource management could benefit from the insights, gained from a bigger number of
cases.
Apparently, the interpretation and comparison of different conflict patterns cannot be
done without considering the action context. Individual case characteristics (like the
occurrence of certain species, or the party a major belongs to) and more general factors that
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might influence a number of cases should be taken into consideration. In the realm of
Natura 2000, for example, stable context factors have been the characteristics of occurring
habitats and species (physical world), the prevalence of cooperative strategies in nature
conservation, the system of the European Union, the performance orientation of public
administration and the necessary budget consolidation (social world). Dynamic context
factors have been flood events (physical world), upcoming elections, or the reorganisation
of the public administration (social world).
Similar factors have been noted in other cases that are related to land management.
Sneddon et al. (2002, p. 671), for example, highlight the role of normative, political-
economic and technological arenas in shaping interaction and discourses in water related
conflicts
Despite their importance, such context factors are not included in the graphical repre-
sentation of CPA. Due to its complexity, the social and physical context can only be
modelled partially. It is indirectly represented, as it shapes the orientations and resources of
the actors within the actor arena. Nevertheless, a closer assessment of the context supports
the development of resource management strategies that address the identified conflict
patterns. Such an assessment is part of the development of resource management strategies
including the choice of adequate participatory methods.
From Analysis to Process Design
As it was stated in the introduction, participatory methods are mainly distinguished
alongside their purpose and outcomes, their constellation of actors (actor attributes and
interaction) and the necessary resources. These variables should inform the choice of
adequate methods as they allow characterising different approaches according to their
scopes and conditions. Figure 4 gives an aggregated overview over main distinction
variables that are considered in recent literature on participation in natural resource
management and planning (Newig et al. 2006; van Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp 2002; Kallis
et al. 2006; Stirling 2006; Rauschmayer and Wittmer 2006; Rowe and Frewer 2000) and
links them to the features of CPA. This connection allows building the bridge from the
analysis of a current situation to the design of a participatory process.
The choice of participatory methods starts from a definition of the purpose of the
planned process. CPA supports this step by discovering existent conflicts and their drivers.
The conflict type(s) inform about the concerned interests and the degree of rationality
within the actor arena. With this knowledge it is possible to decide whether participation
should be consensual with an emphasis on the settlement of value or positional conflicts or
if it is rather useful as a supportive tool to find best possible solutions for distributive or
rule conflicts. Accordingly, techniques can be chosen that rather aim at reaching consensus
or that aim at the rationalisation of a decision by eliciting and sharing different forms of
knowledge.
However, the purpose of a participatory process is not only given through the specific
situation within the actor arena but is also subject to context factors that can barely be
influenced. Especially the goal to gain acceptance for predefined outcomes is often set by
the social context. Laws have to be implemented and actors are forced to cultivate political
majorities, just to mention two common pressures from the context. Even if they are not
explicit, such frame conditions have to be taken into consideration when using CPA to
decide on the goal of participatory processes.
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Further, the prevalent conflict types can inform the choice of the interaction mode that
is required. Depending on the direction of conflicts (one-way, mixed or reciprocal) it is
more or less important to support reciprocal interaction or to empower the actors to
Fig. 4 Links between the characteristics of different participation techniques and the findings of CPA
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advocate for their interests. Rule transparency and the integration of different types of
information, for example, is necessary in mixed conflicts that affect different hierar-
chical levels and actor types. Relational conflicts between different authorities would
benefit from an institutionalisation of interactions that clarifies their positions by
transparent decision modes and competences. In contrast, distributional and value con-
flicts with individual landowners involved, could better benefit from the opportunity for
mutual learning by integrating different types of information and a broad coverage of
interests.
CPA builds on a sound analysis of the actor arena and helps to identify and characterise
different actor types. This knowledge helps to choose participatory techniques that dis-
tinguish between their suitability for different attributes of the involved actors. Some
techniques are useful to deal with homogeneous or heterogeneous constellations; others
require a minimal openness within the actor arena. In contrast to the high emphasis on
different interaction modes, research to participatory methods lays astonishingly little
attention on the distinction of actor types and their resources. ‘‘Power differentials’’ are
usually mentioned in terms of decision modes and the validity of knowledge (‘‘local
knowledge’’) but omit other resources of power and influence. CPA in this realm could be
even more effective if there was more knowledge about the suitability of different par-
ticipatory techniques with respect to the actor attributes.
Eventually, the price has to be taken into consideration when deciding on the ‘‘best’’
participatory method. Sometimes, the ideal process would be far too time and cost con-
suming in relation to the (un)importance of the issue under consideration. The settlement
of highly emotional conflicts, for example, might be too cost intensive compared to the
expectable benefit for the resource management issue. Sometimes it might be better to
ignore escalated conflicts that concern only marginal areas and to concentrate the effort on
other sites. These assessments are influenced by the social context, as they are dependent
on the political support, budget issues and the public opinion.
In addition to the main conceptual connections between CPA and the choice of par-
ticipatory methods described in this section, there are further more specific links that
cannot be worked out into detail in this paper, as they are highly dependent on the specific
case. The available resources within the actor arena, for example, could influence the
methodological choice; it might be the case, that actors are prone to finance a facilitator
and hence, support a method that would not be feasible otherwise.
Conclusion
CPA was developed and tested with the implementation of Natura 2000 on local and
regional level in Germany. To estimate the transferability of CPA to other resource
management scenarios, the characteristics of Natura 2000 and their implications for CPA
are discussed in the following.
Implementation in the European Union takes place in a multilevel setting that involves a
variety of collective actors and the subsidiary principle favours conflicts of position
between different administrative levels. In spatially limited local cases, the multilevel
approach of CPA might be useless, while a deeper look on emotionally driven personal
conflicts might be necessary. Nevertheless, many policy fields have a multilevel compo-
nent and a transfer of CPA to other resource management strategies—at least in federal
systems of OECD countries—seems to be promising.
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Unlike other natural resource management issues, nature conservation goals usually
have no private advocacy but are persecuted by public authorities or associations. A
formalised tool like CPA is functional in this context as it benefits from the integration into
standard administrative procedures. Dealing with issues that lack central responsible
actors, it might be difficult to operate CPA when it comes to a practical application. CPA
requires someone who carries out the analysis and who has norm setting power to integrate
the results into decision making procedures. Experience of the German Landcare Asso-
ciation shows, that CPA is helpful to get insight into a field of actors. However, it only
develops its full potential if the results are connected to ongoing administrative procedures.
Another particularity of nature conservation issues is their (re)distributive component
that restricts the action scope of some actors while enlarging that of others. Typical
common good issues like air pollution or freshwater management might affect different
actor types and generate conflicts that are only partly covered by CPA. Even if the actor
constellations in the sub-fields of natural resource management (water management,
agriculture, nature conservation, forestry) are partly overlapping, some actors might take
roles that provide them other resources than those considered in CPA. Nevertheless, the
moderate formalisation of CPA allows for a comparison of different constellations. Par-
ticularly in research it could help to elicit ‘‘typical’’ natural resource management conflicts
and inform promising strategies to prevent from these in the future.
Natura 2000 provides a large amount of cases that favour formalised approaches like
CPA. One advantage lies in the comparison of cases on a rational basis. Even unique
projects with an extensive bargaining leeway could benefit from a concise analysis of the
current situation; however, it might be more difficult to analyse conflicts within an open
actor arena. Regional development processes for example, might cover so many different
issues and actors, that it could be difficult to identify a particular set of actors, actor types,
interests and conflict types. However, it is one open research question if there are ‘‘typical’’
settings, which might be valid for different policy fields and issues. The advantage of CPA
lies in its moderately formalised approach that allows for the integration of non-formalised
and qualitative approaches depending on the specific scope of analysis and the given
constraints for data gathering.
The moderate ‘‘standardisation’’ of the outcomes allows for the conceptual link to
different political (steering) approaches. As it was shown, the outcomes can be linked to
the capacities of different participation methods in order to support the exploitation of
participation-niches that are left by political programme(s). Based on these considerations,
an even broader use of CPA can be suggested: CPA could be one method to inform the
choice of other political governance and steering instruments, be they participatory or not.
The research on Natura 2000, for example, displayed an heterogeneity of actor constel-
lations and their prevailing power resources that could be addressed not only by
participatory strategies but also by incentives and regulatory measures.
CPA combines the advantages of formalised approaches with a deeper, more qualitative
analysis of different conflict types, underlying orientations, interests and power resources.
The transferability to other resource management strategies seems to be promising, but has
to be proved by further research.
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